The Finite Futurity (BT425) (2025) 绘画 由 Noël Van Hoof

Martin Heidegger – Being and Time – BT425

But just as he who flees in the face of death is pursued by it even as he evades it, and just asin turning away from it he must see it none the less, even the innocuous infinite sequence of “nows” which simply runs its course, imposes itself 'on' Dasein in a remarkably enigmatical way. Why do we say that time passes away, when we do not say with just as much emphasis that it arises? Yet with regard to the pure sequence of “nows” we have as much right to say one as the other. When Dasein talks of time's passing away, it understands, in the end, more of time than it wants to admit; that is to say, the temporality in which world-time temporalizes itself has not been completely closed off, no matter how much it may get covered up. Our talk about time's passing-away gives expression to this 'experience': time does not let itself be halted. This 'experience' in turn is possible only because the halting of time is something that we want. Herein lies an inauthentic awaiting of 'moments' – an awaiting in which these are already forgotten as they glide by. The awaiting of inauthentic existence – the awaiting which forgets as it makes present – is the condition for the possibility of the ordinary experience of time's passing-away. Because Dasein is futural in the “ahead-of-itself”, it must, in awaiting, understand the sequence of “nows” as one which glides by as it passes away. Dasein knows fugitive time in terms of its 'fugitive' knowledge about its death. In the kind of talk which emphasizes time's passing away, the finite futurity of Dasein's temporality is publicly reflected. And because even in talk about time's passing away, death can remain covered up, time shows itself as a passing-away 'in itself'.

(Translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson)

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Martin Heidegger